Contact KSN
First Right of Refusal - Protection or Illusion
Illinois Bar Journal, April 1986
In 1960, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a cooperative housing community could enforce a restrictive covenant which provided that if a member sought to sell his unit, the association should, upon receipt of proper notice, have twelve months in which to purchase that member's interest, at the price either fixed in the notice, or by agreement. If the right was not exercised within that period, then the membership could then be sold on the open market. Gale v. York Center Community Cooperative, 21 Ill.2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30, 1960.
Although the aforestated case established the precedent of the preemptive right, or right of first refusal, in Illinois, the concept was promoted primarily for cooperative housing developments which were fairly common at that time. The right of first refusal was then extended to condominium associations.
A cooperative, or "co-op," is the establishment of a corporation for the purpose of communally owning and maintaining property. The interests of the members are represented by shares of stock or ownership and entitle the members to the perpetual use and occupancy of their units and common areas. Membership is generally valued in terms of the payoff balance of a mortgage on the entire premises divided by the number of units, plus a factoring in of additional consideration for the common areas and the overall market value. If an owner walked away from his unit, the remaining members would still be responsible for the entire outstanding loan balance, with or without that defaulting owner's contribution. Thus, the purpose of the "preemptive right" was to allow the remaining group of owners the absolute right to screen and even reject a potential member, if there was even an unrealistic belief that the proposed member might be a detriment to the community or pose a financial risk for the remaining members.
The Illinois Supreme Court weighed the "utility of the restraint as compared with the injurious consequences that will flow from its enforcement. If accepted social and economic considerations dictate that a partial restraint is reasonably necessary for their fulfillment, such a restraint should be sustained." The rule of Gale v. York Center, et al. became the rule in Declarations of Covenants established for probably a majority of condominium associations developed since the adoption of the Illinois Condominium Property Act in 1963.
However, the legality of this covenant running with the land is clouded by the probability and practicality of enforcement. This is further complicated by the dictates of the mortgage market which prevails in the mid-1980's and in all likelihood is headed for "legal extinction."
A typical first right of refusal reads as follows:
SALE, LEASING OR ALIENATION. Sale or Lease. Any Unit Owner other than the Trustee who wishes to sell or lease his Unit Ownership (or any lessee of any Unit wishing to assign or sublease such Unit) shall give the Board not less than thirty (30) days prior written notice of his intent to sell or lease and subsequently, the terms of any contract to sell or lease, entered into subject to the Board's opinion as set forth hereinafter together with a copy of such contract, the name, address and financial and character references of the proposed purchaser or lessee and such other information concerning the proposed purchaser or lessee as the Board may reasonably require. The giving of such notice shall constitute a warranty and representation by the giver thereof that he believes such offer, and all information contained in said notice, to be bona fide, true and correct in all respects. The members of the Board acting on behalf of the other Unit Owners shall at all times have the first right and option to purchase or lease such Unit Ownership upon the same terms, which option shall be exercisable for a period of thirty (30) days following the date of receipt of such notice of contract. If said option is not exercised by the Board within said thirty (30) days, the Unit Owner (or lessee) may, at the expiration of said thirty (30) day period and at any time within ninety (90) days after the expiration of said period, proceed to consummate the sale (or sublease or assignment of) such Unit Ownership to the proposed purchaser or lessee named in such notice upon the terms specified therein. If the Unit Owner (or lessee) fails to close said proposed sale or lease transaction within said ninety (90) days, the Unit Ownership shall again become subject to the Board's right of first refusal as herein provided.
The problems of strict compliance with the aforestated provision are multi- faceted.
First, most owners do not contact the Association for an express waiver of the preemptive right, until long after the required tine period elapses and usually just prior to the date of closing of a sale.
As a practical matter, should an association expend its tine and resources, as well as the possibility of substantial legal fees, seeking injunctive relief in order to void a sale for the owner's mere indiscretion of not sending adequate advance notice? Further, is a court going to terminate a sale to a qualified bona fide purchaser of a condominium and reverse the positions of the parties, merely on the basis of an owner's neglect in not seeking prior consent? It is unlikely that a court would not "balance the equities" and refuse to grant injunctive relief sought after considering the potential hardship.
Secondly, most declarations have the additional requirement that the board of directors of the association must obtain 2/3 or 3/4 of the owners' approval within a specific timeframe in order to authorize the board of directors to exercise this right.
As a practical matter, this type of majority is at best difficult to obtain even on the most significant issues. To obtain the necessary majority of owners to authorize the board to utilize substantial sums from the operating budget or levy a special assessment to fund the purchase under the option is highly improbable.
Third, aside from the practical difficulties of enforcement, recent case law has eroded the former "iron-clad" position of the covenant, particularly as it pertained to blanket exclusions without the association having to show cause for exercising it.
In Phillips v. Hunters Trails Community Association, 685 F2d 184, 1982, the Seventh Circuit held that the association's exercise of the right of first refusal was racially motivated and constituted both a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as well as the Fair Housing Act. An award of punitive damages by the trial court was affirmed. This opinion then opens the door for an action against a board whenever it acts arbitrarily, capriciously or in that case, illegally.
In Berkley Condo, Assoc., Inc, v. Berkley Condo. Residences, Inc., 448 A2d 510, 1982, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the New Jersey statute created a rebuttable presumption of unconscionability regarding provisions in association by-laws giving the association a right of first refusal to buy a condominium upon resale, and was constitutional.
In both decisions, the reviewing courts found that it was clearly in the public interest to maintain unrestricted freedom in the transfer of real estate.
The reviewing court in the Berkley case concluded that "private property rights are not absolute and are always subject to the reasonable exercise of the police power."
Following these decisions, the 3rd District of Florida, which is a primary source of condominium-related litigation, struck down a right of first refusal clause as a restraint on alienation in Aquarian Foundation, Inc, v. Shalom Houses, Inc., 448 So.2d 1166, 1984.
In this case, a unit owner sold her unit without association consent as required by the declaration, and the association actually sought to set aside the conveyance. The court found that since the board could arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably withhold its consent, without a corresponding obligation to purchase or provide a purchaser; this constituted an invalid and unenforceable restraint.
Although this case can be viewed narrowly on its merits, a general trend may be developing overall. For years, cases such as the Gale v. York Center remained unassailable, even under the most questionable of circumstances. The prevailing philosophy extended far beyond the economics of the co-op and included social considerations. However, the practicality of unenforceability, coupled with recent successful court challenges, raises the entire issue of what was the intended purpose as it pertained to protection of the condominium association in general.
Illinois has also recently addressed this issue in the significant case of Wolinsky v. Kadison, 114 Ill. App.3d 527, 449 N.E.2d 151, 1984, when the court held, "Plainly, by exercising a right of first refusal, a condominium association prevents a prospective purchaser from buying a unit. We therefore believe that if a right of first refusal is exercised so that a prospective purchaser is unable to purchase a unit because of his or her race, religion, sex, sexual preference, marital status or national origin, the ordinance has been violated." (The ordinance in question is the antidiscrimination provision of the City of Chicago Condominium Ordinance.) Clearly, Associations are now being held accountable for their actions and exercise of the preemptive right can no longer be arbitrarily mandated by a Board of Directors without a showing of good cause.
It appears that there is a more prevailing concern by most resident owners with the problems in dealing with renters rather than enforcing preemptive rights on sales. In Illinois, Section 309.2 of the Illinois Condominium Property Act and Article IX of the Code of Civil Procedure permits the condominium association to utilize the remedy of forcible entry and detainer for violations of the covenants and Section 318 et seq. further binds renters as well as owners to the covenants and restrictions of records as well as the Act itself.
There are now clearly adequate remedies available to an association to control these situations, even within the shadow created by Coventry Square Condo. Assn. v. Halpern, 181 NJ. Supes 93, 1981, where the reviewing court struck down unreasonable and unnecessary restriction on renters or owners which created a limited class and violated the Equal Protection clause.
The recent amendments to the Illinois statute in conjunction with the governing document should be further expanded upon in the form of reasonable rules and regulations. This can foreclose any concerns about renters, real or imagined.
The final problem in enforcing the right of first refusal is created by the current market conditions dictated by the mortgage banking industry. Fannie May, FHA, VA, the secondary market, etc., is the order of the day. Conventional financing as it has evolved, usually prohibits the financing of a purchase of a unit situated in an association where the declaration gives the association the right of first refusal.
Creative draftsmanship, amendments to declarations and elaborate waiver letters have circumvented this problem to a certain degree. At best, associations are blindly waiving their rights in order to facilitate easy marketability on behalf of its membership and not interfere with the ability of an owner to sell his unit. Most developers are now omitting the right of first refusal from the documents in order to arrange for attractive block financing for new purchasers.
In 1960, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a cooperative housing community could enforce a restrictive covenant which provided that if a member sought to sell his unit, the association should, upon receipt of proper notice, have twelve months in which to purchase that member's interest, at the price either fixed in the notice, or by agreement. If the right was not exercised within that period, then the membership could then be sold on the open market. Gale v. York Center Community Cooperative, 21 Ill.2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30, 1960.
Although the aforestated case established the precedent of the preemptive right, or right of first refusal, in Illinois, the concept was promoted primarily for cooperative housing developments which were fairly common at that time. The right of first refusal was then extended to condominium associations.
A cooperative, or "co-op," is the establishment of a corporation for the purpose of communally owning and maintaining property. The interests of the members are represented by shares of stock or ownership and entitle the members to the perpetual use and occupancy of their units and common areas. Membership is generally valued in terms of the payoff balance of a mortgage on the entire premises divided by the number of units, plus a factoring in of additional consideration for the common areas and the overall market value. If an owner walked away from his unit, the remaining members would still be responsible for the entire outstanding loan balance, with or without that defaulting owner's contribution. Thus, the purpose of the "preemptive right" was to allow the remaining group of owners the absolute right to screen and even reject a potential member, if there was even an unrealistic belief that the proposed member might be a detriment to the community or pose a financial risk for the remaining members.
The Illinois Supreme Court weighed the "utility of the restraint as compared with the injurious consequences that will flow from its enforcement. If accepted social and economic considerations dictate that a partial restraint is reasonably necessary for their fulfillment, such a restraint should be sustained." The rule of Gale v. York Center, et al. became the rule in Declarations of Covenants established for probably a majority of condominium associations developed since the adoption of the Illinois Condominium Property Act in 1963.
However, the legality of this covenant running with the land is clouded by the probability and practicality of enforcement. This is further complicated by the dictates of the mortgage market which prevails in the mid-1980's and in all likelihood is headed for "legal extinction."
A typical first right of refusal reads as follows:
SALE, LEASING OR ALIENATION. Sale or Lease. Any Unit Owner other than the Trustee who wishes to sell or lease his Unit Ownership (or any lessee of any Unit wishing to assign or sublease such Unit) shall give the Board not less than thirty (30) days prior written notice of his intent to sell or lease and subsequently, the terms of any contract to sell or lease, entered into subject to the Board's opinion as set forth hereinafter together with a copy of such contract, the name, address and financial and character references of the proposed purchaser or lessee and such other information concerning the proposed purchaser or lessee as the Board may reasonably require. The giving of such notice shall constitute a warranty and representation by the giver thereof that he believes such offer, and all information contained in said notice, to be bona fide, true and correct in all respects. The members of the Board acting on behalf of the other Unit Owners shall at all times have the first right and option to purchase or lease such Unit Ownership upon the same terms, which option shall be exercisable for a period of thirty (30) days following the date of receipt of such notice of contract. If said option is not exercised by the Board within said thirty (30) days, the Unit Owner (or lessee) may, at the expiration of said thirty (30) day period and at any time within ninety (90) days after the expiration of said period, proceed to consummate the sale (or sublease or assignment of) such Unit Ownership to the proposed purchaser or lessee named in such notice upon the terms specified therein. If the Unit Owner (or lessee) fails to close said proposed sale or lease transaction within said ninety (90) days, the Unit Ownership shall again become subject to the Board's right of first refusal as herein provided.
The problems of strict compliance with the aforestated provision are multi- faceted.
First, most owners do not contact the Association for an express waiver of the preemptive right, until long after the required tine period elapses and usually just prior to the date of closing of a sale.
As a practical matter, should an association expend its tine and resources, as well as the possibility of substantial legal fees, seeking injunctive relief in order to void a sale for the owner's mere indiscretion of not sending adequate advance notice? Further, is a court going to terminate a sale to a qualified bona fide purchaser of a condominium and reverse the positions of the parties, merely on the basis of an owner's neglect in not seeking prior consent? It is unlikely that a court would not "balance the equities" and refuse to grant injunctive relief sought after considering the potential hardship.
Secondly, most declarations have the additional requirement that the board of directors of the association must obtain 2/3 or 3/4 of the owners' approval within a specific timeframe in order to authorize the board of directors to exercise this right.
As a practical matter, this type of majority is at best difficult to obtain even on the most significant issues. To obtain the necessary majority of owners to authorize the board to utilize substantial sums from the operating budget or levy a special assessment to fund the purchase under the option is highly improbable.
Third, aside from the practical difficulties of enforcement, recent case law has eroded the former "iron-clad" position of the covenant, particularly as it pertained to blanket exclusions without the association having to show cause for exercising it.
In Phillips v. Hunters Trails Community Association, 685 F2d 184, 1982, the Seventh Circuit held that the association's exercise of the right of first refusal was racially motivated and constituted both a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as well as the Fair Housing Act. An award of punitive damages by the trial court was affirmed. This opinion then opens the door for an action against a board whenever it acts arbitrarily, capriciously or in that case, illegally.
In Berkley Condo, Assoc., Inc, v. Berkley Condo. Residences, Inc., 448 A2d 510, 1982, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the New Jersey statute created a rebuttable presumption of unconscionability regarding provisions in association by-laws giving the association a right of first refusal to buy a condominium upon resale, and was constitutional.
In both decisions, the reviewing courts found that it was clearly in the public interest to maintain unrestricted freedom in the transfer of real estate.
The reviewing court in the Berkley case concluded that "private property rights are not absolute and are always subject to the reasonable exercise of the police power."
Following these decisions, the 3rd District of Florida, which is a primary source of condominium-related litigation, struck down a right of first refusal clause as a restraint on alienation in Aquarian Foundation, Inc, v. Shalom Houses, Inc., 448 So.2d 1166, 1984.
In this case, a unit owner sold her unit without association consent as required by the declaration, and the association actually sought to set aside the conveyance. The court found that since the board could arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably withhold its consent, without a corresponding obligation to purchase or provide a purchaser; this constituted an invalid and unenforceable restraint.
Although this case can be viewed narrowly on its merits, a general trend may be developing overall. For years, cases such as the Gale v. York Center remained unassailable, even under the most questionable of circumstances. The prevailing philosophy extended far beyond the economics of the co-op and included social considerations. However, the practicality of unenforceability, coupled with recent successful court challenges, raises the entire issue of what was the intended purpose as it pertained to protection of the condominium association in general.
Illinois has also recently addressed this issue in the significant case of Wolinsky v. Kadison, 114 Ill. App.3d 527, 449 N.E.2d 151, 1984, when the court held, "Plainly, by exercising a right of first refusal, a condominium association prevents a prospective purchaser from buying a unit. We therefore believe that if a right of first refusal is exercised so that a prospective purchaser is unable to purchase a unit because of his or her race, religion, sex, sexual preference, marital status or national origin, the ordinance has been violated." (The ordinance in question is the antidiscrimination provision of the City of Chicago Condominium Ordinance.) Clearly, Associations are now being held accountable for their actions and exercise of the preemptive right can no longer be arbitrarily mandated by a Board of Directors without a showing of good cause.
It appears that there is a more prevailing concern by most resident owners with the problems in dealing with renters rather than enforcing preemptive rights on sales. In Illinois, Section 309.2 of the Illinois Condominium Property Act and Article IX of the Code of Civil Procedure permits the condominium association to utilize the remedy of forcible entry and detainer for violations of the covenants and Section 318 et seq. further binds renters as well as owners to the covenants and restrictions of records as well as the Act itself.
There are now clearly adequate remedies available to an association to control these situations, even within the shadow created by Coventry Square Condo. Assn. v. Halpern, 181 NJ. Supes 93, 1981, where the reviewing court struck down unreasonable and unnecessary restriction on renters or owners which created a limited class and violated the Equal Protection clause.
The recent amendments to the Illinois statute in conjunction with the governing document should be further expanded upon in the form of reasonable rules and regulations. This can foreclose any concerns about renters, real or imagined.
The final problem in enforcing the right of first refusal is created by the current market conditions dictated by the mortgage banking industry. Fannie May, FHA, VA, the secondary market, etc., is the order of the day. Conventional financing as it has evolved, usually prohibits the financing of a purchase of a unit situated in an association where the declaration gives the association the right of first refusal.
Creative draftsmanship, amendments to declarations and elaborate waiver letters have circumvented this problem to a certain degree. At best, associations are blindly waiving their rights in order to facilitate easy marketability on behalf of its membership and not interfere with the ability of an owner to sell his unit. Most developers are now omitting the right of first refusal from the documents in order to arrange for attractive block financing for new purchasers.
In conclusion, although an association may have a very elaborate provision for right of first refusal in its Declaration, it cannot practically enforce it. An anxious seller of a unit does not want it enforced and a trial court is unlikely to overturn an arms-length transaction if the association is not consulted in advance, unless they can show irreparable harm. Many board members operate under the illusion that the preemptive right offers some type of protection. However, in the long run, it is practically unenforceable and in all likelihood should be automatically waived in most instances. The board that is seriously concerned about the regulation of the conduct and oblivious of its residents would be better off directing its time and energy to a well drafted, enforceable set of Rules and Regulations.
